In response to the Great Inflation, governments were more willing to cede greater independence to central banks, giving them better specified mandates; and central banks were more willing to pledge adherence to rules and transparency; with both, apparently, limiting discretionary intervention. 1 The resulting Great Moderation was thus, in large part, seen as a triumph of rules over discretion; and a recognition by policy makers of the time consistency problem. The success of reducing and stabilizing the inflation rate produced a consensus on the appropriate role and mandate for central banks . The global financial crisis that started in August 2007 and the disruptions of the subsequent seven years upset this consensus, and seemingly novel and unprecedented interventions were employed to address the panic and then revive markets and economies. prescribed by Bagehot (1873) and other nineteenth century authorities, where it is clearly announced that financial institutions will not be bailed out. In this paper, we provide a historical framework to evaluate the "unprecedented" actions of the Fed, comparing its actions to central bank responses to crises in the nineteenth and twentieth century. This exercise reveals that there is less novelty in the Federal Reserve's recent actions and that central banks over the last hundred and fifty years have often not followed the simple LOLR policy rule. Historical exploration of actual LOLR practices provides a context for deciding whether the Federal
Reserve's deviation from a Bagehot rule was appropriate.
Our review of leading financial crises in Britain, France and the United States, from the Overend-Gurney panic of 1866 to the collapse of LTCM in 1998, documents that 1 See for example, Bernanke et. al, (1999) , Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, (2002) . 2 As quoted in Coy (2008) .
"unprecedented" actions by central banks are the norm rather than the exception. The reason for this observation lies in the necessity of reconciling central banks' mandates for price stability and financial stability. Under fixed and flexible exchanges rate regimes, price stability requires a rule that can be easily monitored so that central banks, and the political authorities who delegate policy responsibility to them, will be induced to follow credible policies that avoid timeinconsistency problems. The nature of financial crises is that such that addressing them almost invariably requires a temporary violation of the price stability rule and a Bagehot rule. Attempts to set a policy rule for financial stability by following Bagehot's recommendations accepts that policy will not seek to forestall a crisis but only respond when a financial crisis has hit, taking remedial action to assist solvent institutions but allowing the shock from the crisis percolates through the whole economy. However, in most episodes, central banks have acted preemptively to manage failures of large financial institutions and buffer the economy from the shocks emanating from the crisis. While the reactive approach risks a recession or a deeper recession, the pre-emptive approach creates incentives for moral hazard. For the latter approach to be successful, two elements are essential. First, the conditions when the price stability rule will be temporarily violated must be well-understood so that it becomes a contingent rule and there will be no market penalty. Secondly, in order to ensure that the pre-emptive approach does not set the stage for the next crisis, actions must be taken to mitigate moral hazard.
Rules and Contingent Rules for Central Banks
The problem of setting a proper mandate for a central bank dates to their very origin.
Central banks became a common feature of sovereign nations in the nineteenth century, although there were precursors, notably the Bank of England and the Riksbank. They evolved as countries grappled with the problem of how to provide price stability and financial stability for their economies. 3 To provide a monetary anchor, nations employed metallic standards that converged towards the gold standard that provided a monetary anchor, ensuring long but not short-term price stability. For transactions, a coin-only regime proved very costly and banks became the issuers of currency and deposits. Governments also directly issued currency, leading to high-and hyper-inflations, a manifestation of the time-inconsistency problem of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) arising from the temptation to exploit 3 For a recent survey of the evolution of banking and central banking see Grossman (2010) .
seigniorage. This problem illustrated the need to delegate the responsibility for money creation to independent agencies. The standard origin of a nineteenth century central bank was as a privileged government-chartered joint stock firm, privately owned, with clearly specified rules for money creation that were easy to monitor by transparency rules and/or the appointment of some of its officials by the government (Grossman, 2010) . Control of these banks was also exercised by the limited duration of their charter. For the premiere central banks, the Bank of England and the Banque de France, their charters were for fixed periods, well over a decade---to minimize short-term political interference. Upon expiration, their charters were subject to modification prior to renewal by Parliament. 4 The key, simple point here is that central banks were agents delegated by the legislature to conduct policy. To ensure that central banks avoided the time-inconsistency problem, they were expected to follow rules that limited excessive money creation. However, governments recognized that following a rigid rule could lead to undesirable outcomes because of the evolution of financial markets or unforeseen events. This problem with fixed rules points to the difficulty that the principal had in writing a contract for the agent that would cover all contingencies. The legislative process was often slow; unable to respond quickly to a financial crisis. Consequently, in certain circumstances escape clauses or practices, permitting the violation of the rules for price stability were engineered, yielding contingent rules. Violations allowing for discretion are allowed in extraordinary circumstances. Bordo and Kydland (1995) have argued that the gold standard functioned as a contingent rule in the nineteenth century.
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Permitting its suspension in times of war or financial crisis gave the monetary authorities (provided they were not responsible for the crisis) with flexibility to cushion to the shock to the economy. 6 This use of discretion did not necessarily result in the market imposing a penalty on the violating country, such as a higher risk premium for its sovereign bonds, as long as discretion was constrained by a transparent commitment to return to the rule when conditions returned to normal. 4 Although Canada did not have a central bank, its decennial bank act of the nineteenth century served a similar purpose; and American national banks had finite charters until the McFadden Act of 1927. 5 In the literature on sovereign debt, "excusable defaults" represent a similar phenomenon (Grossman and van Huyck, 1988) . 6 Adherence to the gold standard was rarely a mechanical process and central banks often responded to domestic economic objectives (such as interest rate smoothing) in addition to movements in gold reserves (See Bordo, 1986; Eschweiler and Bordo, 1994 , Dutton, 1984 , Pippenger, 1984 and Giovannini, 1986 . However, these actions were subordinated to the dominant commitment to keep the exchange rate within the gold points.
Another way to think about contingent rules for central banks is through the lens of the rules versus discretion debate. Rules have the advantage that they can avoid the timeinconsistency problem and ensure that central bank pursues the price stability objective.
However, rules have the disadvantage that unforeseen shocks or changes in the structure of the economy may lead these rules to produce very poor and even possibly disastrous outcomes. A solution to this problem, as argued by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) , is "constrained discretion".
In other words, central banks need to be constrained from systematically engaging in policies with undesirable long-run consequences, but then are allowed some discretion for dealing with unforeseen or unusual circumstances. Contingent rules are constructed in this fashion.
For the Bank of England, the Act of 1844 or Peel's Act set the rules under which it would operate. The law set the total fiduciary issue of banknotes that could be backed by securities at £14 million; any issue above this required 100% backing with specie. A rush for liquidity by the financial institutions, discounting notes at the Bank of England, sometimes threatened a violation of the law; and the Treasury could offer the Bank "chancellor's letter" that would guarantee to indemnify the bank and secure any needed legislation to protect the Bank (Wood, 2005; Giannini, 2011) . During the panics in 1847, 1857 and 1866, the Banking Act of 1844 was effectively suspended, relieving the specie constraint on the Bank of England's discretionary issue of currency. Understood to be only for the duration of the crisis, these exceptions "did no damage to convertibility commitment."
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As was recognized at the time, the problem is, of course, defining what constitutes and emergency. Perhaps, the most notable example of a suspension of a rule during the gold standard was Great Britain's suspension of convertibility from 1797 to 1821. In response to the threat of a French invasion, Great Britain shifted to a non-convertible paper pound that permitted inflationary finance. This long, temporary suspension lasted for the remainder of the Napoleonic wars, until a postwar deflation return the pound to its prewar gold parity. Believed to be following a contingent rule, the government was allowed by the market to borrow at very low nominal rates in the inflationary environment that were consistent with a credible government promise to eventually return the pound to its prewar parity (Bordo and White, 1994) . Too rigidly adhering to a rule may impose huge costs. For example, it might be argued that during the Great 7 Bordo and Kydland, 1995, p. 431 . These authors provide a table for 21 countries covering the period of the classical and interwar gold standards that documents to clearly defined circumstances when suspension of the gold standard was credibly consistent with the exchange rate regime.
Depression of the 1930s the Federal Reserve interpreted its mandate too narrowly by failing to respond adequately to the financial crisis and thereby contributing to the depression. To ensure that the Fed had greater flexibility, in the aftermath of the economic collapse, Congress put Section 13(3) into the Federal Reserve Act that permitted the Fed to use discretion to provide credit beyond its usually constrained limits in "unusual and exigent circumstances."
A vital question facing central banks today is how to combine the mandates for price stability and financial stability. In times of crisis, a contingent rule in which "constrained discretion" is allowed, may be superior to a simple rule by permitting temporary deviations to accommodate certain types of shocks that both policy makers and the market understand to be exceptional. The historical evidence suggests that it is possible to design contingent rules that overcome the potential for moral hazard that is inherent in permitting some discretionary authority. In this paper, we detail several important crises that illustrate the benefits of following a contingent rule, provided that deviations from the rule are followed by actions that substantially reduce the moral hazard that follows from such interventions. To frame our discussion, we begin by identifying the generally accepted "unprecedented" actions that the Fed 
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To put these "unprecedented" actions during the Crisis of 2008 into a historical perspective, Table 1 divides them into seven categories, with with an "X" in the top row indicating that they were undertaken. In the following rows we present selected crises from the previous 150 years for comparison, which are accompanied by brief narratives explaining how and why exceptional or "rule-violating" actions were undertaken by the monetary authorities to quell the crisis. Contemporary policy debates about how a LOLR should respond to a financial crisis are framed as much as by history as by theory. This history is largely informed by a "classical" view of how the Bank of England checked financial crises in the late nineteenth century. The progenitors of this view, Henry Thornton (1802) and Walter Bagehot (1873) , argued that the Bank of England should react to a banking panic by lending freely through the discount window at a high rate of interest on all collateral that would be considered good in normal, non-crisis times, preventing illiquid but not insolvent banks from failing. 12 Humphrey (1975) and Bordo (1990) point out that according to this approach---which we will term the "Bagehot's Rule"---it is not the duty of the LOLR to prevent financial shocks but neutralize them once they have occurred by halting the spread of a panic. Bagehot's rule is a reactive policy, unlike the "unprecedented" actions that may be considered to be preemptive policies .
Reviewing the history of the Bank of England, Bagehot emphasized that the Bank, having the greatest reserves, could quell a panic by providing cash for good collateral at a rate sufficiently high to deter excessive use of the bank's facility. Although Bagehot's book was written after the Overend, Gurney, and Co. Panic of 1866, it has been recently documented (Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini, 2012 ) that his prescription was put into effect after a crisis in 1847. In this panic, the Bank kept its discount rate below the market rate and rationed credit, exacerbating the crisis. The Bank of England's full adherence to what became Bagehot's rule was made plain in 1866 when the large Overend-Gurney bank was recognized to be insolvent and the Bank of England signaled that it had no intention of aiding the bank, precipitating a panic (Flandreau and Ugolini, 2014) . When it was announced that Overend-Gurney had suspended, the bank rate was raised from 7 to 9 percent and then to 10 percent, well above the market rate for bills. Banks and bills brokers crowded the discount window at the Bank, but there was no decline in the quality accepted as collateral. Eventually, the panic abated. While the Bank's response to the 1866 panic is considered by many to be the correct response that can be announced ahead of time, thereby providing commitment, it should be noted that the Bank was only able to act as a LOLR because it had secured a "chancellor's letter" from the Treasury. The chancellor's letter promised indemnification, if needed, via a bill in Parliament. The letter from Barings Brothers à la française. These actions get little attention in the debate over the appropriate rules for a LOLR, but they were important steps in the evolution of central banking policy in response to the evolution of the financial system in the 1880s.
In 1882, a crash on the Paris stock market led to the collapse of Union Générale, one of France's largest banks and as well as several smaller banks. Defaulting counterparties in the forward market for stocks caused a crucial number of brokers to fail, threatening the solvency of the whole Paris Bourse. The brokers lacked the statutory collateral the Banque de France required for loans, but a consortium of banks, with the right collateral, stepped in as an intermediary, ensuring that the brokers had sufficient liquidity. Although the Banque de France also lent freely to the rest of the market, it refused to provide any assistance to the insolvent Union Générale, the Bourse in Lyon and other banks. (White, 2007) . A long deep recession ensued that caused some in the Banque to question whether they had acted correctly. Thus, when a run on one of the largest banks, the Comptoir d'Escompte, began in 1889, the Banque lent freely at a rate, higher than the market rate, to all borrowers with good collateral; but it also saved the insolvent Comptoir (Hautcoeur, Riva, and White, 2014) . This bank had supported an attempt to corner the copper market with large loans and massive guarantees of copper forward contracts. When the price of copper collapsed, the bank was insolvent. Pressed by the Minister of Finance who offered an early renewal of the Banque's charter as an inducement, the Banque provided loans of 140 million francs against all the Comptoir's assets, good and bad---a violation of the strict statutory rules governing collateral. A guarantee syndicate of banks, whose membership was determined partly on ability to pay and partly on involvement in the copper 13 Grossman (2010) discusses some early examples of bailout in Australia (1826), Belgium (1839) and Germany (1848). speculation, was induced to cover any losses up to 40 million francs (Hautcoeur, Riva, and White, 2014) . Some on the Banque de France's Council of Regents were opposed to this unprecedented action, but the credit to the Comptoir halted a run that appeared to presage a general panic. The Banque then held the Comptoir's bad assets, permitting the copper market to recover and an orderly resolution to proceed through the courts. The buildings and accounts of the failed bank were transferred to its recapitalized successor. Severe financial penalties were meted out to the Comptoir's board of directors and others involved in the disaster, actions that appear to have been designed to mitigate moral hazard from this intervention. No other major financial crisis occurred in France until the outbreak of World War I. In Table 1 , this 1889 crisis is tagged as having two "unprecedented" interventions---a bailout/resolution and Treasury intervention.
A year after the French crisis, in November 1890, one of the leading British banks, Baring Brothers was found to be on the brink of failure. Before a panic could take hold, the Bank of England took unprecedented pre-emptive actions (Clapham, 1945) . Barings had originated and underwritten vast issues of Argentine securities. Having borrowed heavily and unable to sell of its portfolio of these bonds, as their value dropped, the bank approached the Bank of England. Alarmed that this leading house might be insolvent, the Bank informed the Treasury of the situation. In contrast to France in 1889, the initiative for action came from the central bank and the British Treasury refused countenance any direct support, even though the Chancellor of the Exchequer believed that, if Barings, went under the crisis would be far more severe than the Overend-Gurney Crisis of 1866. However, following the example of 1866, he offered a "chancellor's letter," which have would permitted the Bank to increase its circulation beyond its legal limits. This offer was refused by the Governor of the Bank of England who apparently was afraid that news of this action might set off a panic.
However, the modest gold reserves of the Bank were threatened as institutions discounted with the Bank, presenting the possibility of a currency crisis in the globalized capital market of the period. To shore up its gold reserves, the Bank of England borrowed £3 million from the Banque de France, providing Treasury bills as collateral that were obtained by selling consols to the Commissioners of the National Debt. The Governor explained to his French counterpart that although the Bank could induce gold to flow to England by raising the bank rate, such a measure "would have been too severe," alarming the City and "preferred not to adopt the course usually taken." (Clapham, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 330) . In addition, £1.5 million was purchased from Russia by the sale of Exchequer bonds.
Meanwhile, it was quietly ascertained that Barings was probably insolvent. Sensing these problems, the Bank of England was flooded by requests to discount Barings paper (Clapham, 1945) . Faced with accepting bad collateral, the Governor demanded that the Treasury provisionally guarantee loans to Barings to maintain its liquidity so that the Bank would have time to form a guarantee syndicate to absorb any potential losses. The Governor quickly assembled a syndicate of banks and other financial houses whose pledges totaled £17,105,000.
This sum was more than sufficient to protect the Bank from losses, as its maximum advance was £7,526,600. The guarantee syndicate was to last for three years, while the Bank "nursed"
Barings assets. However, this task was not completed and, over the protests of some syndicate members, it was renewed for another two years, with a reduction in the pledge to a quarter of the initial sum. Liquidation was finally completed in 1895; and although the funds of the syndicate were not drawn upon, the Barings family was compelled to cover losses with their private fortunes-a step to mitigate the moral hazard consequences of intervention. Although the Bank of England was generally praised for this action that pre-empted a panic, the Economist warned its readers that this was a dangerous precedent, describing the potential risk of moral hazard. In Table 2 an anachronistic term, no "systemically important financial institutions" or "SIFIs" had emerged.
The merger waves that ultimately produced a nationally concentrated industry were still in the future (Capie and Rodrik-Bali, 1982) . While a panic could render many banks illiquid, Thornton Cortelyou tried provided some liquidity by depositing $25 million in the major central reserve city banks on October 24 but with little effect (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) .
As credit dried up, interest rates shot up and stock prices fell. On the same day as the Treasury acted, J.P. Morgan persuaded the member banks of the NYCH to lend to a "money pool" to enable brokers on the New York Stock Exchange to complete a settlement. The rush for liquidity did not abate and on October 25 th , the NYCH announced the issuance of clearing house loan certificates-an action that eased the demand for liquidity by increasing liquidity for interbank transactions---and the suspension of deposit convertibility (Moen and Tallman, 2000) .
As a consequence a premium on currency arose, creating to an incentive to import gold from abroad. The New York Fed also gave these banks additional reserves through open market purchases of $160 million, ensuring that the crash was confined to the stock market and did not fuel a banking panic (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 339 ).
In the aftermath of the New York Fed's action, credit spreads declined to levels below those before the stock market crash (Mishkin, 1991) . The low level of credit spreads up until
October 1930 is remarkable given the sharp economic contraction up to that point and the over 40% decline in the value of common stocks. This phenomenon suggests that the unprecedented actions of the New York Fed were successful in containing the initial financial disruption.
However, the purchases of securities that the New York Fed made were in excess of those approved by the Open Market Investment Committee, an unprecedented action that departed from established operating procedures, angering the Board. In Table 1 
The Banking Panics of 1930-1933
The Federal Reserve's policy mistakes that contributed to the onset and duration of the Great Depression have been well documented. 14 In accounts of the economic collapse, the failure of the Fed to act promptly and forcefully as a LOLR to halt and offset the four banking panics has played central role (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Romer, 1990) . A variety of reasons for these mistakes have been offered: poor institutional design of the Fed, poor theory and interpretation of the effects of monetary actions, and the fear that the nation's ability to remain on the gold standard was imperiled (Bordo and Wheelock, 2014) . The reserve banks set their own discount rates subject to Board approval. 15 The Fed focused on ensuring that only "real bills" were discounted, narrowly defining the type of collateral-eligible paper--that would be acceptable. 16 Discounting member banks would receive Federal Reserve notes or deposits at the Fed, with the total notes and deposits created by each Reserve bank constrained by gold cover requirements of 40% for notes and 35% for deposits, with eligible paper equal to 100% of outstanding notes. Although the 1913 act's precursor, the Aldrich bill 14 A short list seminal works would include Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Wicker (1966) , Meltzer (2003) , Wheelock (1991 ) and Bordo and Wheelock(2013) . 15 The discount rate declined somewhat as a policy tool and open market operations gained importance, being used to hit a borrowed reserves target. 16 The Act permitted discounting of "notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial transactions." Discounting of loans for "the purpose of carrying or trading in stocks, bonds or other investment securities' was forbidden, with the exception of U.S. government securities. Discounting was only permitted for loans with a maximum term of 90 days (180 days for agricultural loans).
had broader discounting provisions, where any direct bank obligation, if approved by the Secretary of the Treasury was allowable, this was omitted from Federal Reserve Act.
Furthermore, the Fed could only lend to member banks, not the more numerous non-member banks, except in extraordinary circumstances approved by the Board. 17 Thus, by design, Fed was constrained and had potentially less flexibility in responding to a crisis than European banks.
While events would prove differently, the founders of the Fed, strong believers in the real bills doctrine, may have thought that by enshrining the real bills doctrine in the Federal Reserve Act "they had created a "foolproof mechanism that would prevent panics from occurring in the first place." (Bordo and Wheelock, 2013 ).
There was another crucial difference between Fed discount rate policy and those of the Bank of England and the Banque de France. Instead of maintaining a discount rate above the market rate, discount rates tended to be below. The adverse selection problem quickly arose.
The Fed found that it was not simply accommodating borrowers with temporary liquidity problems; it had a substantial number of habitually weak borrowing banks; good borrowers were discouraged by the stigma they incurred. Nevertheless, the Fed's accommodation of seasonal money market demands is believed to have eliminated banking distress and panics in the 1920s (Miron 1986 , White, 2013 .
The first banking crisis, and in particular, the demise of the Bank of United States offers an interesting contrast to the rescues of the Comptoir d'Escompte, Baring Brothers, and LTCM in 1998. Although it was relatively smaller, runs on the bank caused both the New York Fed and the New York Superintendent of Banks to fear that its failure might spawn more runs. Pumping liquidity into this bank, the Fed provided over $20 million (Lucia, 1985) . concerns. The act went further to provide a means to lend to banks that had insufficient eligible assets for collateral, trying to broaden the Fed's ability to provide liquidity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, pp. 320-1) . For a longer-term market, the mortgage market, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act was passed in 1932 to provide a means for savings and loans, savings banks and insurance companies to borrow on collateral of first mortgages (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) .
Although this legislation was influenced by the building and loan associations lobby (Snowden, 1995) , its passage reflected the limitations on the Fed's ability to create additional lending accommodations from other banking institutions." Thus, the Fed was granted the authority to take "unprecedented" actions, recognizing that it had been too constrained by law and outlook.
In Table 1 , we identify four "unprecedented" actions for 1930-1933 but they were not initiated by the Fed. Congress broadened the Fed's means to conduct monetary policy (4), the bank holiday provided a means to have an orderly reopening and closure of banks (5), the RFC and Federal Home Loan banks provided more aid via Treasury contributions (6), and the bank holiday led to a novel auditing ("stress test") of the banks (7).
In earlier crises, the monetary authorities sought to limit future risk-taking; did Congress seek to do this as well in the 1930s? It has been argued that the package of New Deal reforms did much to undermine the incentives to limit risk-taking in banking, notably the elimination of double liability for bank stock and the introduction of deposit insurance (White, 2013) .
Nevertheless, Congress was aware of the moral hazard implications of deposit insurance (Calomiris and White, 1994 ) , and it refused to bailout depositors in banks that failed before the creation of the FDIC and it created a fairly limited insurance program aimed at protecting smaller depositors. The expansion of deposit insurance in later years was the product of a regulatory dynamic, largely driven by lobbying of interest groups in the banking industry (White, 1998) .
The Penn Central Bankruptcy
Prior to 1970, commercial paper was considered one of the safest money market instruments because only corporations with very high credit ratings issued it. It was common practice for corporations to continually roll over their commercial paper, that is, issue new commercial paper to pay off the old. Penn Central Railroad was a major issuer of commercial paper, with more than $200 million outstanding, but by May 1970 it was on the verge of bankruptcy and it requested federal assistance from the Nixon administration. Once the Federal Reserve made the decision to let Penn Central go into bankruptcy, it was concerned that Penn Central's default on its commercial paper would, as Brimmer (1989) puts it, have had a "chilling effect on the commercial paper market" (p. 6), making it impossible for other corporations to roll over their commercial paper. The Penn Central bankruptcy, then, had the potential for sending other companies into bankruptcy which, in turn, might have triggered a fullscale financial panic. To avoid this scenario, the New York Fed contacted several large money center banks on Saturday and Sunday, June 20 and 21, alerted them to the impending bankruptcy and encouraged them to lend to their customers who were unable to roll over their commercial paper, indicating that the discount window would be open to them to facilitate their loans. With the interest rate on discount loans below market interest rates, banks borrowed $575 million. In addition, on June 22 the Fed decided to suspend Regulation Q ceilings on deposits of $100,000 and over in order to keep short-term interest rates from rising, and the formal vote was taken the next 18 See Maisel (1973) and Brimmer (1989) for further discussion of the Penn Central bankruptcy episode.
day to allow the FDIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to take parallel action. The net result was that the Federal Reserve provided liquidity to ensure the continued smooth functioning of the commercial paper market.
The rationale for the Fed's action was that an unprecedented bankruptcy in the commercial paper market would led lenders to pull out because they would no longer be confident that they could accurately screen borrowers, which was reflected in credit markets by a widening of credit spreads. After these actions, credit spreads came back down and commercial paper rates fell sharply, indicating a rapid recovery in the commercial paper market. The financial disruption from the Penn Central bankruptcy therefore turned out to be small and the recession which started shortly before the Penn Central bankrupty occurred was mild.
This policy action clearly was unprecedented and a violation of the Bagehot rule because lending was done at below market interest rates. However, these below market rates and the Fed's commitment to provide funds to keep that market functioning had the advantage that it made it profitable for banks to lend directly to a market where credit had dried up. This approach enabled the Fed to direct credit to nonfinancial firms that it was not monitoring, having the banks lend to them instead. These banks then had the incentive to monitor these firms to prevent them from taking on excessive risk because the banks would be on the hook if the loans went sour. The Fed thus used the banks as delegated monitors to ameliorate moral potential hazard that could lead to excessive risk taking. This action avoided the necessity for the Fed to lend to firms that it did not supervise and had little expertise in monitoring; and it is treated in Table 1 as a non-Bagehot liquidity facility even though the action was indirect.
Continental Illinois 1984
In 1984, Continental Illinois, the seventh largest bank in the United States, experienced a bank run when uninsured depositors became convinced that it was insolvent. In its drive to become the nation's largest commercial and industrial lender, Continental Illinois became imperiled by large oil and gas loans that it had purchased. Rumors of Continental Illinois' problems started runs by large uninsured depositors in early May 1984, leading the bank to borrow heavily from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Its borrowings from the Fed reached $3.5 billion by May 11. Continental Illinois then sought an additional $4.5 billion from a group of banks, collateralized by $17 of assets on deposit at the Fed (Wall and Peterson, 1990) .
The size of the institution and its ties to other banks led by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC to conclude that intervention was necessary to prevent a general banking panic. A bailout plan was put forward on May 17, where the FDIC gave the bank $1.5 billion in new capital and a group of banks injected $500 million. A group of 28 banks provided a $5.5 billion line of credit, with the Fed supplying additional liquidity. Crucially, the FDIC promised to 100 percent protection to all creditors of the bank, thus halting the run (FDIC, 1997).
In the next two months, regulators sought a merger partner for Continental but failed.
For the final resolution, in July 1984, the FDIC agreed to buy $4.5 billion of bad loans from the bank, with a $1 billion charge-off by the bank and a capital infusion of $1 billion from the FDIC.
The FDIC assumed Continental's $3.5 billion debt to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in exchange for a transfer to the FDIC of assets from Continental Illinois, which had a book value of $4.5 billion and an adjusted book value of $3.5 billion. The FDIC also received a package of nonperforming, classified or poor quality loans with a book value of $3 billion. These were valued at $2 billion, with the $1 billion taken by the bank as a charge against its capital.
Furthermore, Continental Illinois gave the FDIC a note for $1.5 billion to be repaid within three years by transferring loans with a book value of $1.5 billion to the agency. To offset the $1 billion charge to capital, the FDIC purchased preferred stock issues in the bank holding company that were delivered to the bank as equity. The top management and board of directors were removed (FDIC, 1998). In Table 1 (Stern and Feldman, 2004) .
Stock Market Crash of 1987
The biggest danger to the economy from the stock market crash of 1987 did not come from the decline in wealth resulting from the crash itself, but rather from the threat to the clearing and settlement system in the stock and futures markets. discount loans to banks so that they could make these loans. Given this backstop, banks increased their loans to brokers and to individuals to purchase or hold securities by $7.7 billion. As a result, the markets were not disrupted and a market rally ensued raising the DJIA by over 100 points (over 5%) on October 22. This action by the Fed was reminiscent of the actions taken by the Fed during the October 1929 panic period in which it provided liquidity to enable money center banks to take over call loans which had been called by others.
Credit spreads did rise in the immediate aftermath of the crash; the junk bond-Treasury spread jumped by 130 basis points the week of the crash and by another 60 basis points over the next two weeks. However, within two months, this credit spread returned to pre-crash levels (Mishkin, 1991) . The failure to enter a recession after the stock market crash, despite many forecasters predictions along these lines, is consistent with the view that the Fed's actions were effective in calming the credit markets. In Table 1 , we treat 1987 as we did 1929, as having unusual monetary easing
LTCM 1998
The rise and collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1999 demonstrated for the first time the potential of individual non-banking intermediaries-particularly hedge funds---to spawn a general financial crisis that required the Federal Reserve to intervene, though not to make use of its broad Federal Reserve Act 13(3) powers.
Organized as a limit liability partnership for high wealth and institutional investors, like most hedge funds, LTCM's purpose was to engage in speculative strategies virtually free of regulation and oversight. Starting with a capital of $1.3 billion in 1994, LTCM grew quickly to $7 billion in 1997 when the management concluded that there were limits to its strategy and returned $2.7 billion of equity to investors, leaving the firm with $4.8 billion in early 1998. LTCM sought to reap extraordinary returns by "market-neutral arbitrage" (Edwards, 1999; Lowenstein, 2000) . Using derivative contracts it took long positions in bonds that it believed to be overvalued, and short positions in bonds it considered to be undervalued. In early post-Asian crisis in 1998, this strategy focused on the large spread between high risk bonds and low risk bonds that they believed to be a temporary and soon-to-be reversed phenomenon. Certain of their forecast, LTCM borrowed at least $125 billion from banks and entered into derivative contracts with a notional value in excess of $1 trillion---creating the potential for very large gains or losses if spreads narrowed or widened. This risk was amplified by the fact that LTCM held large quantities of illiquid securities in its portfolio.
Lenders and counterparties were willing to accept LTCM's huge exposure because of the outsize reputation of its partners and because they were largely unaware of the magnitude of the risks it had incurred thanks to LTCM's unchallenged secretiveness. contribute to the belief in the "Greenspan put", a form of moral hazard in which financial institutions expect monetary policy to help them recover from bad investments (e.g., see Tirole and Farhi, 2009, and Keister, 2010) . The Greenspan put is one factor that has been cited as playing a role in the excessive risk taking that helped lead to the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009.
Overview of the Historical Experience
It is common for economists to recommend that central banks adopt Bagehot's rule for managing financial crises. By signaling a commitment to this rule, central banks can limit moral hazard and discourage risk-taking that can pave the way for the next financial crisis. While The bankruptcy of Penn Central in 1970 seems to have followed this playbook. Although subject to significant political pressure to help the railroad, the Fed refused to provide assistance.
But concerned that Penn Central's bankruptcy would hammer the commercial paper market, the Fed signaled to banks that they could readily borrow from the discount window with no stigma, if their customers could not roll over their commercial paper and needed short-term credits.
Penn Central received no favors and the rest of the market was assured access to short-term lending.
The necessary drastic measures needed to constrain moral hazard when there is a preemptive central bank intervention are evident in these late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century cases. Beginning in the late twentieth century, pre-emptive discretionary interventions involved financial institutions continued in the business, though they sustained huge losses,. In addition, the widening of interest rate and swap spreads was met by the Fed's lowering of interest rates. While this was effective in narrowing spreads, interest rates were not raised afterwards and Greenspan's promise to prevent crises became the "Greenspan put." The violation of the price stability rules thus did not appear to be temporary and the resolve to contain moral hazard was sharply diminished.
This overview of the historical episodes suggests that they can be classified into three categories. The first category includes episodes in which the central bank adhered too strictly to the Bagehot and price stability rules and thus took no pre-emptive actions to deal with financial crises: the U.S. 1930-33 period is the classic example. It is commonly agreed that the Federal
Reserve's inactivity during this period was a disaster, not only for the U.S., but for the world economy. The second category includes episodes in which central banks deviated from the Bagehot and price stability rules, but were clearly committed to returning to the rule and took actions to reduce moral hazard: these include the U.K in 1890, France in 1889, and the U.S. in 1929, 1970 and 1987 . We would argue that these central bank deviations from the Bagehot and price stability rules were highly successful in limiting the damage from the financial disruption to the economy, and yet were conducted so that moral hazard was limited and therefore did not make the financial system more vulnerable. The third category includes episodes where the central bank and the government engaged in purely discretionary actions where efforts to limit moral hazard were weak: these include the Continental Illinois episode in 1984 and monetary policy easing taken in 1998 in the aftermath of the LTCM crisis. Although these discretionary actions limited the damage from the financial disruption, they should not be viewed as successful interventions because they created moral hazard incentives for financial institutions to take on excessive risk that set the stage for later financial crises.
Conclusions
The historical experience provides several lessons.
• First, the "unprecedented" • Second, "unprecedented" actions in which price stability rules were temporarily abandoned were frequently successful in stabilizing the financial system and the aggregate economy. Indeed, unwillingness to deviate from these rules, as occurred during the 1930-1933 episode led to a disastrous outcome. This episode provides an important rationale for the Federal Reserve adoption of "unprecedented" actions during the recent global financial crisis.
• Third, the historical experience indicates that deviations from a Bagehot rule can promote financial instability if no steps are taken to mitigate the moral hazard that these actions Reserve's "unprecedented" actions during the global financial crisis should thus be judged not on whether they should have been pursued but rather on whether they were accompanied by adequate measures to constrain moral hazard.
